This paper describes a method for n players, a majority of which may be faulty, to compute correctly, privately, and fairly any computable function f(Xl, . . . ,x,) where xi is the input of the i-th player. The method uses as a building block an oblivious transfer primitive.
Introduction
The problem of performing a distributed computation in a fault-tolerant and private manner has been addressed by many researchers in the past few years. In a sequence of papers [Goldreich Micali Wigderson 87, Ben-Or Goldwasser Wigderson 88, Chaum Crepeau Damgaard 88, Ben-Or Rabin 891 it has been shown that when both private channels between pairs of players and broadcast channels are available, any distributed computation (e.g. function or game) can be performed privately and correctly, in spite of worst case behavior of the faulty players, if they are in minority.
When in majority, faulty players can be shown to be able to prevent the completion of certain computations by quitting early. Moreover, they may quit while being "ahead", i.e. having learned more about the output than non-faulty players.
A special computation problem where quitting early is especially harmful was addressed by [Luby Micali Rackoff 831: the simultaneous exchange between two players of random secret bits. Each player must be protected against the case the other player quits early. The fairness notion they proposed (and achieved under the assumption the quadratic residue problem is hard) is that the probability that player A knows the secret bit of player B is within an 6 of the probability that B knows the secret bit of A (the protocol is polynomial time in E-' ).
[Ym 861 proposed (and showed how to achieve under the assumption that integer factorization problem is hard) the following notion of fairness for arbitrary two party boolean protocols. Suppose two players A and B want to compute a boolean function f privately and correctly. Informally, a protocol is fair if given any strategy of a faulty A , the non-faulty B has a strategy such that the probability that B will learn f, given that A will learn f is at any time during the protocol is as high as it is in the beginning of the protocol. The solution is based on the existence of trapdoor functions. These results were extended in ([Galil Haber Yung 89, Brickell Chaum Darngaard VanDeGraaf 87)) to the multi-player case.
The drawback of the above fairness definition is its severe limitation on the power of the faulty players. Since the strategy of the non-faulty players depends on the strategy of the faulty players, the faulty players program strategy must be chosen first and can not change depending on the program of the non-faulty players.
[Beaver Goldwasser 891 proposes a different notion of fairness, free from this limitation. A protocol to compute function f is said to be fair: if there exists a strategy for player B such that for any strategy of faulty subset of players A the ratio of the odds of B and A to compute the outcome of f is (about) the same at any time during the protocol as it is in the beginning of the protocol. It is shown how t o achieve such fairness for multi-player protocols for boolean functions (as well as different boolean functions for different participants). The solution in [l] is based on trapdoor functions, and in [a] on the existence of ari oblivious transfer primitive.
New Results. In this paper we show how to define and achieve fairness of any (not only boolean) function from strings to strings. This allows iteration and composition of protocols preserving fairness. In fact, we can achieve fairness for any interactive probabilistic computation, (i.e. games -to be defined in the journal version of this paper). The solution is based on the existcncc of an oblivious transfer primitive between every pair of players and a broadcast channel. The hilure probability of the the protocol we propose is exponential while previously known was a polynomial.
We also propose a simpler definition of security for multi-player protocols which still implies previous definitions of privacy and correctness. [Kilian Micali Ilogaway 901 have proposed independently another set of definitions of security. The relationship between the set of definitions has not been fully analyzed yet. Inputs. We assume that the number n of players and identity i of each player P;
are included in its input. Initially coin-flips and inputs are independent. They may become correlated if their joint distribution became conditional on the information (say their sum) released by the player. Such coin-flips we call reEewant. Players may want to keep them secret, to protect the privacy of their inputs. Other irrelevant coins flips may be released after the end of the protocol. The third type are unused coin-flips. They are kept, so that modifications of the protocol may use them and run with no extra random sources. The protocol must separate the three types before any communication starts and the unused flips must have at least constant density on the tape. We will treat the relevant coin-flips as part of the complete input, unless we talk of the proper input.
Outputs. Also, each player's output in non-faulty protocols consists of its input, relevant coin-flips, and only one more string P ( I ) , common to all players. This assumption does not limit generality, since we can always add one last step to any protocol P in which every player i uses a secret random string p ; and tells all other players the value of exclusive or: yi @ p i . Then, the common output is the concatenation of all y; @ p;. The new protocol is, clearly, equivalent to the old one and retains all its properties, like correctness, privacy, etc.
Notation 1 Let I = ( X I , . . . , x n ) be the input vector to protocol P = (PI,. . ., P,).
Then, P ( S ) will denote the random variable which maps the (uniformly distributed)
contents of random tapes a; of the Pi's into the output vector y' = ( y l , . . . , y,) where y; is the output of machine Pi. 
Faulty Versions of Protocols
Versions of a protocol capture deviations from it by the faulty players.
Definition 3 A version of protocol P is any protocol P', with P!F = &.
Note, that no restriction is put on Pb. They may deviate from the PF at any time and freely exchange messages among members of F . This raises two questions.
Question 1: How does a player become faulty and enter F?
Answer: We assume an adversary who points to a player and makes it faulty.
Question 2: How does such an adversary decide who to point to?
Answer: We consider two models for such adversary.
In the first model, the adversary, called the static adversary, chooses the set of faulty player before the beginning of the computation.
In the second model the adversary is called the dynamic adversary. In this model the adversary observes the broadcast messages and private inputs/communication of any (none at the start) players which already became faulty. Based on this information, the adversary may, at any time and repeatedly, choose new players to become faulty. Once a player is faulty it remains faulty and their number is limited by t.
Legal and Moral Faults
Some faults affect the input-output behavior of a protocol but, for trivial reasons, can never be prevented by the non-faulty players.
For example, players in F may choose to misrepresent their inputs ZF as z$ and run PF accordingly; also they may choose to replace their output YF with entirely different strings yb. We refer to such faulty behavior as immoral but legal. 
Note:
The dynamic adversary in the legal version is active only during the input and output stages. In these stages he corrupts players choosing them on the basis of inputs (and at the end of outputs as well) of those players he previously corrupted.
When in majority, faulty players have other non-preventable ways to affect the protocol's input-output behavior. Namely, if players quit early, they can prevent the good players from completing the computation.
4
Definition 5 A legal-minority version of a multi-player protocol P is a legal version F' of a protocol identical to P except that 0 At the start of the protocols the players broadcast whether their inputs are empty. If anyone's input is empty, the protocol is aborted and players output error.
0 At any time n -t players may broadcast "I am faulty". Then the protocol is aborted and non-faulty players append to their output the identity of the players who declared themselves faulty.
Robust and Fair Protocols
Definition 6 A protocol P = ( P l y . .
. , P,) is robust (respectively semi-robust), if for every version pt of 3, there exists a legal (respectively legal-minority) version p, of F, indistinguishable from @' .
4
While robustness is a "complete" quality, semi-robustness requires additional feature: quit-fairness. It insures that interrupting the protocol does not give an unfair advantage in knowledge to the perpetrating majority.
In addition to players 1,. . . , n, we will speak of player 0 to mean the coalition of faulty players whose joint input is 5 0 = 2~. (from here on i ranges from 0 to n).
For generality, we assume that not all output information has equal value. Some may be useless, as the players may somehow get it for free upon termination of the protocol 3. Suppose this free information for player i is v(.'). The function may not even been known to i during the protocol, but could be known to the faulty players. (The reader may ignore this extra generality, assuming V = 0.)
Let &(i) be the probability (over .',a) of output y = P(Z) given K ( Z ) and z;, and 6(i, 2, G ) = &Ey#p(4)(jiy) = pp(I) & p ( I ) 1-p;(3 be the ratio of the average (over y) probability of a wrong answer to the probability of a correct answer (from the point of view of player i). 
y)
Let hp,i,t,a be the history seen by player i upto step t on input i, and coin tosses Let pr(i, 5, G ) denote the probability of the correct output P ( 5 ) (taken over 5, G )
be the ratio of the odds of wrong and correct values for
Let Rt(i, 2) be the expectation (over a) of rt and D t ( i , Z) be its standard deviation.
given x(5) and hi,;,t,a (from the point of view of player i). where Hi,i,t is a set of histories of exponentially small probability over 0.
P ( Z )
. % $ . ! # does not depend on 2 .
2)).
A protocol is robust for minority if it is semi-robust and quit-fair.
2.4
Definition 8 A function f is stable if f(2) is either nil or f(.'), for all I in its domain and XI, s.t. xIF = X ! F . By running a commitment protocol on inputs 3 we will transform any function f into a stable function f' (on possible outcomes y'of the commitment protocol), such that f'(y3 = f(z') for some z', z j F = Z!F. 
Stable Functions and Commitment Protocols

The Merits of the Definitions
Traditionally, several properties are required of a protocol such as privacy, correctness, independent choice of the inputs by faulty players, when a minority is faulty. And, additionally, quit-fairness, when majority is faulty. All versions of robust protocol satisfy all these properties: Proof: Privacy and independent commitment to values are shown as above. The definition of correctness for a faulty majority is an extension of correctness in the faulty minority case. Namely, we allow non-faulty players to output the special ''error" output when faulty players quit in the middle of the protocol. For this extended definition, the same argument used for correctness in above theorem will work. Fairness is guaranteed as part of the definition of robust for minority protocols. Now previous theorems in the literature can be cast in this terminology: In addition to players 1,. . . , n, we will speak of player 0 to mean the coalition of faulty players whose joint input is z o = XF. (from here on i ranges from 0 to n). The 2;'s for player i are chosen at random with some (not necessarily easy computable) distribution. Recall that we assume the original protocol to compute one common output P ( 2 ) (in addition to xi and relevant coin flips). This is so since at the end of the original protocol each player can choose a random string pi, and send all other players y; @ pi. The common output will the concatenation of all p; €3 y;. Clearly, the same privacy properties hold. Thus, from here on we speak of a protocol to compute a single output. The protocol consists of four stages: preprocessing, commitment, computation, and revelation.
Preprocessing
If the number of potential faults is in minority the preprocessing stage is skipped. If the number of potential faults is in majority, then first the entire network engages in a preprocessing phase, independent of the inputs. The outcome of the preprocessing phase is either error or the protocol proceeds to stages of commitment, computation and revelation. An error implies that the protocol is aborted. A majority of faulty players can always force an early abort, but their decision to cause an early abort is independent of the non-faulty players inputs. Commitment
The commitment stage reduces the problem to computing a stable function P ( 2 ) .
It also creates a sequence of (committed to but hidden) coin-flips a (each the sum mod2 of coin-flips of all users).
Computation
The computation stage reveals the sum (taken over ZAP'"') of P(Z) with random password w (chosen based on a). Fairness is not an issue at this stage, because any player can (were the protocol interrupted) make this sum totally random by erasing her coin-flips.
Revelation
At the revelation stage w is revealed. Privacy is not an issue at this stage, since w has no information about the inputs (beyond what the function value reveals).
Let e = 1/1Z1. The revelation protocol consists of T < 21wI macrosteps in which the protocol reveals next unused portion of cr and interprets it as a vector WT E Zp'.
It then reveals a sequence of E -~ independent bits (one per micro step) 6,(cr) chosen such that bt = ( V T . w) (the inner product of VT and 20) with probability 1/2 + e. At the end of the macro-step the actual value of (VT . w) is r e~e a l e d .~ Clearly the logarithm of rt(i, 5, Z ) (see Definition 7) cannot change by more than O ( E ) per micro-step. After going through .5-3 micro steps with an exponentially small probability the majority of the coin flips differs from VT w. Thus, at the last step of the macro step when VT -w is revealed, rt+l -vt is changed negligibly uness this exponentially rare failure of majority has happened. This takes care of the first requirement of quit-fairness.
Assume for generality sake that at termination of ;he protocol player i may even be given an extra information K(5). (The function V to be later handed out may not necessarily be known to the non-faulty players during the protocol but could be known to the faulty players).
One can easily show that Rt decreases with almost the same speed for all 5, i, Q. 3The purpose of not revealing (PIT . w ) immediately is to assure that by quitting early the faulty players can only receive one coin flip more than non-faulty ones toward the value of (PIT . w ) . After 21201 macrosteps, w itself can be revealed.
Sometimes the faulty coalition can be restricted to a polynomial number of possible combinations (known to all parties). Also the parties may be confident at the start that their inputs are random and completely secret. Then a more sophisticated procedure could be used to discriminate against possible coalitions, which "know too much". We ignore this issue for now.
4The fairness requirement does not prevent erratic behavior at the end of the protocol, thus in special cases when it is detectable that the players doubts are concentrated on a logarithmic number of outputs we can do better by tossing a cube of all possible answers slightly biases toward the correct one.
How to Use the Oblivious Transfer Primitive
The Oblivious Transfer Assumption
We assume that every two players can perform an oblivious transfer.
An oblivious transfer [Rabin, In [Beaver Goldwasser 89a] a version of a protocol achieving semi-robustness for boolena functions based on the existence of trapdoor functions, is described. Here, we describe a protocol based on the existence of oblivious transfer, in which the error probability is improved from the previously known l/polynomial [Beaver Goldwasser 89b ] to l/exponential. We let t be the number of potential adversaries, k denote the security parameter.
Preprocessing Stage
Global Commitment and Decommitment
Each player globally commits to a library of 0's and 1's. A global commit has properties similar to a commit between two players. In fact, many of the the ideas are similar to the two party bit-commitment of [Kilian 88 1.
In particular, preprocess-global-commit(A,v,J) is a protocol for player A to globally commit to a bit w such that if the preprocessing stage is completed successfuly, then there exists a unique value 6 associated with J such that 5This form of oblivious transfer was shown equivalent to the original one proposed by Rabin. commited bits) to a subset S of players such that either all non-faulty players in S will receive the correct value, or all non-faulty players will broadcast that A is faulty, or an exponentially rare event will happen. In the case of decommiting G1 @ Gz, the privacy of G1 remains intact for the entire network.
If non-faulty A committed a randomly chosen in ( 0 , l ) then the probability that the faulty players guess the value of v before it is decommitted to one of them is negligible. This is achieved as follows. Step 1. Step 4. Each player stores I , {ci, i E I } and the information he received during the global commit of player A to vf, v?,
M M I T ( A , J)" and the J t h bit is declared committed. (The value of this bit is all(@
Step 2.
'each bits vi is represented by a pair v?, vf such that vi = v: @ vf. 'It suffices that players alternate in choosing elements in I ' if the protocol is aborted during an execution of preprocess-global-commit, then all non-faulty 'In this step A proves to each player B in turn that for all remaining i , j E I vi @ ci = v, @ c j .
loclearly each player may have received different bits during the oblivious transfer and thus has players output error. different information.
A t the outset of the preprocessing stage, every player runs the protocol preprocessglobd-commit for a sufficient number of values v = 0 and P) = 1 as will be necessary for A to commit bits during the life time of the protocol.
During the protocol player A globally commits to bit u by broadcasting index J , such that the bit committed during the preprocessing global commit stored in BIT -C O M M I T ( A , J ) is m. Once an index J is broadcast it is never reused.
To decommit to a subset S of the players, a committed bit stored in BIT - A , J) , A runs the following protocol.
C O M M I T (
Global Decommit(A,S,J):
Let u be the bit committed in BIT -C O M M I T ( A , J ) and S the subset to which it should be decommitted.
Step 1: A sends in private to each player in S, for all i E I , rep($) and rep($). Players in S set P) = c, @ v : @ vf for the smallest i E I .
Step 2: If any player B E S gets for some i , d an invalid rep (v,d) or inconsistent with information B received during the oblivious transfer stage, then B broadcasts a request that player A should broadcast rep(v",rep(vl) for all i E I.
Step 3: If any player C detects that the information A broadcasts in step 2 is "inconsistent" or invalid, then C broadcasts that A is faulty, otherwise the value of v is taken to be the bit ci @ vf @ P)? where v!, V: are defined by the information which A has broadcast at step 2."
5.2.2
During the protocol player A will need to prove that various bits globally committed are the same. Let v and u be two previously globally committed bits stored in In fact, general properties of data globally committed can be proven in zero-knowledge using the protocols of [Kilian 89, Ben-Or et a1 [4] ]. We chose the parameter a in the preprocess-global-commit protocol so to allow repeated zero-knowledge proob about globally committed bits.
or agree that a bit of the same value has been decommitted.
"By the properties of our global commit protocol all non-faulty players will either declare A faulty
Private Communication Lines
During the protocol players A and B will need to privately communicate and yet 3e able to prove to other players that the messages they send privately were computed correctly with respect to their committed inputs and previously received messages.
If encryption functions were available this would present no problem, however we only have the ability to perform oblivious transfers between every two players.
Thus, in the preprocessing stage every pair of players prepare and globally commit to a supply of 0's and 1's known to A and B alone which both can globally decommit. These bits will be used later for private communication.
This is done by running the following protocol. Step 2. The network chooses at random l iff j E 11 (using the Prove-Equality procedure defined above.) Player A globally commits to randomly chosen bO,bl,r E {O,l}, broadcasts set 12 c I1 such that 12 = { j l G = b o , g = bl,rJ = T } , and proves that bj, = 150, = hl, T J = T iff j E I2 (using the Prove-Equality procedure). If for some i , j E I2 i J # i' A broadcasts a complaint and the protocol is aborted, otherwise A globally commits to 1' such that i = i j , for all j E I2 and proves this fact (using the Prove-Equality procedure). BselectsaJsuchthat theset { g , e , C 3 , r f , ? , j
T -C O M M I T ( A , B , J )
is such that cl = C for all j E I, (a fact B proves to the network), and broadcasts J to the network. If Bo = bi and B1 = bi for all j E I2 (a fact A proves to the network), A decommits r j , j E I2 to B, else J is cast out and the step is repeated. B sets Bc = a21({ra @ i s , s E I,}).
Input Commitment and Computation Stages
At this stage every player A needs to globally commit to its input X A and a sequence of coin flips CYA. Set a! = Cplayer A (YA mod 2.
Let
Computation
Let Cp be the arithmetic circuit over field of elements F computing the legal protocol P (assuming that P has already been modified to output single output to all players). Let 7~ E F be a unique element associated with player B.
In order to allow the network to compute with inputs X A (and a,) A now proves in zero-knowledge to the network that the values privately sent { p z , ( y~) }~ interpolate to a unique t degree polynomial whose free term is X A .
The arithmetic circuit Cp has two types of gates: addition (+), and multiplication ( x ) over the finite field F (scalar multiplication is a trivial extension of + gate).
The circuit is evaluated in a gate by gate fashion. The invariant during the computation stage is that each player holds a share of all inputs to the next gate to be computed, which is globally committed.
Suppose the inputs to a + gate are u and v. Every player A holds P,,(YA) and P,,(YA) (where P,, and P, are random polynomials of degree t with free term u and v respectively). To compute a share of the output u + v , player A computes P,,+,,(~A) = P,,(?;i) + P,(YA). A globally commits to P u + , , ( y~) .
Suppose the inputs to a x gate are u and v. Computing P , , , , , (~A ) (where Puxu is a random polynomial of degree t whose free term is u x u . ) can be reduced to the problem of every pair of players (A,B) computing semi-robustly a two-player function on the shares they hold P,,(TA) and P , , Every message of the player sent while computing the x gate must be accompanied by a zero-knowledge proof that it has been computed and sent correctly with respect to the inputs globally committed and the messages previously received from other players both in private and by broadcast. This is possible as all private messages sent during the commitment and computation stage have been globally committed (as all these messages were sent using the private communication lines set up in preprocess-private-communication. )
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